The official Chinese position regarding the proper historical place of
Koguryo is a natural outcome of current Chinese
views of how an early "Chinese nation" might have
existed in antiquity. This view is a direct proj
ection of the current conception of the multieth
nic PRC state backward in time. In other words,
the way minority nationalities are conceived of
as forming part of a greater Chinese nation today
has been imposed on the China of the remote past,
to make "tributaries" and client states appear as though they formed part of a greater Chinese
nation and were, by the way, quite conscious of
their role as such. This view of the past has been prominent most especially since the 1980s.
The 1982 PRC constitution and the Minority Region
Autonomy Law of 1984 codified the place of ethnic minorities within the greater China, and many
Chinese historians of premodern periods have
even invoked the exact phrases used in these very modern documents to describe the early and pre
modern state. Since the northern part of Koguryo
territories are now within PRC borders, Koguryo was therefore a minority nationality of ancient
China. So are all the other peoples who once
lived in what is now the PRC, and for the most part nobody today cares to expend much time and energy
arguing against this view. But since Koguryo
territories spanned both sides of the Yalu, and since Koguryo has long been embedded in what we
see as Korean historiography, it presents a pro-
blem. And the historians in China know this.
I would disagree with the article Sem cited when it speaks of the relative quiescence of historians in the Koreas regarding the Chinese position. North Korean archaeologists butted heads with Chinese counterparts in the 1960s over interpretations of Parhae's place in history, and a North Korean complaint (more of an accusation, really) at an academic conference in China in 1993 prompted a very defensive reaction on the part of Chinese historians, who had previously not been so insistent (or at least vocal) on Koguryo's having been a "Chinese" state. South Koreans have not been silent either, though I suspect that tourists (including academics) visiting Koguryo archaeological sites in China have caused more general aggravation to museum officials than have any academic exchanges. I suspect that most South Korean scholars who try to get work done in China are sensitive enough to know not to complain too loudly, lest the doors of access to sites and data in China be closed for good (a real possibility, some restrictive measures having been in place for almost a decade now, a direct result of a perceived South Korean encroachment on China's proprietary rights to Koguryo's material remains in China).
The Chinese argument for Koguryo's Chinese-ness is a pretty flimsy one. The two main arguments are, 1) that the Koguryo state grew out of the Han Chinese commandery of Xuantu (i.e., out of Chinese territory), and 2) that Koguryo kings acknowledged their places as "minority nationalities" of China by accepting investiture from Chinese emperors. The problems with this are obvious. There are even weaker arguments than this: for example, more Koguryo refugees wound up in Tang China than in Silla after 668, therefore Koguryo was more Chinese than Korean - this argument comes from a prominent historian in Shenyang. The weaknesses of the arguments are well known to the Chinese historians who promote them (and not all historians in China support the "official" position, by the way, but there are two or three very vocal ones who do). The fact that the two core arguments listed above could also be made to apply to Paekche (and even to Silla, with a little extra twisting of the source materials) is also a troubling matter to the Chinese historians I described above, who want to make clear that Paekche was NOT a Chinese state. The gist of my long-winded statement above is that the Chinese argument regarding Koguryo is weak and defensive, but it accords with current practice in the PRC in making ancient "tributaries" out to be "minority nationalities" of a very vaguely defined greater Chinese nation of the remote past. I do not believe the Chinese position toward Koguryo is an especially sinister one, but is rather one that must exist in order to fall into line with current Chinese views of the Chinese past, which can be traced ultimately, I think, to concerns about territorial security of the present. I would certainly hope that the UNESCO treatment will avoid the pitfall that exists here. But my understanding (which could be mistaken) is that UNESCO did not exactly have an easy time getting the Chinese to accept the registration of the Koguryo murals. And I am quite certain that any hesitation on the Chinese side would have been due to the uncomfortable matter of Koreans' views toward Koguryo and to potential (and already voiced) challenges to the Chinese position. Any UNESCO dealings with China would have had to take these sensitivities into account, and I suspect that some "glossing over" of the "who owns Koguryo" question would have been necessary. I would certainly like to hear more on this from anyone who was involved. Personally, I think the registration of the murals in China is likely to be a good thing, especially if it affords some measure of protection to the tombs and assists in their preservation. I know of at least three successful mural robberies in Ji'an in the past decade (the last one followed by some thirty convictions, I'm told), and some of the loudest complaints I have heard in South Korea regarding the Chinese treatment of Koguryo is the apparent Chinese inability (or unwillingness) to provide adequate protection for the murals. Although the mural tombs in Ji'an (with one exception) are officially sealed to offset deterioration of the murals, tourist groups to Ji'an, most usually from South Korea, regularly gain access to the tombs by making "donations" to the appropriate persons, which further damages the murals. Hopefully, the UNESCO World Heritage registration of the mural tombs will do some good in this regard?
