Sovromuri - Advanced Romanian

 Pentru a intra in posesia despagubirilor de razboi datorate de Romania Rusiei Sovietice s-a semnat la 8 mai 1945 un acord economic intre cele doua state prin care se infiintau companiile mixte cu participatie romana si sovietica denumite sovromuri.

Statul roman si cel sovietic urmau sa investeasca fiecare o parte din capitalul necesar infiintarii acestor companii.

Domeniile vizate de aceste societati erau industria, agricultura, transporturile si sectorul bancar.

Rezultatele acestei colaborari urmau a fi impartite intre cele doua tari, ajutand economia romaneasca sa isi revina dupa cel de-al Doilea Razboi Mondial si in acelasi timp sa-si plateasca datoria de 300 de milioane de dolari.

Acordul nu s-a respectat, sovieticii preluand efectiv controlul asupra principalelor ramuri ale economiei. Ei au folosit drept capital utilaje capturate de la germani, pe care mai apoi statul roman a trebuit sa il rascumpere pe sume exagerate.

Specialistii trimisi de la Moscova au aservit economia Romaniei intereselor sovietice, facilitand transferul rapid si ieftin al unor importante parti ale resurselor tarii catre Uniunea Sovietica, in timp ce propaganda vremii punea accent pe relatiile de prietenie intre cele doua state.

O vina importanta o poarta si comunistii romani ai vremii care nu s-au opus infiintarii sovromurilor, in contextul in care foametea si seceta facea ravagii in 1946, valoarea monedei nationale era foarte scazuta si piata era lipsita de produse de baza, adaugand problemelor postbelice ale tarii.

Infiintarea sovromurilor

Pe 17 iulie 1945 a fost creat Sovrompetrol. In urmatorii ani a ajuns sa detina o treime din productia interna de titei restul apartinand companiilor de stat Muntenia si Moldova. La 1 septembrie 1950 si aceste companii au fost dizolvate si incluse in Sovrompetrol, intreaga industrie petroliera ajungand din acel moment sub controlul sovietic.

Pe 19 iulie s-a infiintat Sovromtransport care a intrat in posesia principalelor rute de navigatie si a porturilor Galati, Constanta, Braila si Giurgiu. Dupa aceea a aparut Sovromcarbune ce se ocupa de exploatarile miniere din Valea Jiului, Sovromtractor ce va deveni Tractorul Brasov Sovrommetal ce extragea minereul de fier de langa Resita, Sovromfilm ce era o unealta de propaganda prin importul de filme sovietice, Sovrombanc ce detinea monopolul bancar precum si alte zeci de societati ce vor fi infiintate in perioada 1945-1952.

Sovromcuart si bomba atomica sovietica

Sovromcuart s-a creat in 1952 fiind printre ultimele societati de acest tip. A furnizat 18.000 de tone de uraniu destinat proiectului Uniunii Sovietice de a isi dezvolta propria bomba atomica, aceeasi cantitate putand sa alimenteze reactoarele de la Cernavoda timp de un secol.

Muncitorii erau prizonieri politici si nu aveau nicio masura de protectie atunci cand manevrau materialele radioactive. Multi mureau din cauza iradierii. In locul lor erau adusi uneori localnici pentru a scoate uraniul din mine, dar care de multe ori nu cunosteau pericolul la care se expuneau. Principalele exploatari erau la Stei si Baita din judetul Bihor zone ce si in prezent sufera de pe urma reziduurile radioactive.

Sfarsitul companiilor mixte romano-sovietice

Din punct de vedere economic tara noastra a avut de suferit foarte mult din cauza acestor societati. Preturile marfurilor erau stabilite la nivelul anului 1938, iar 85 % din exporturile romanesti se indreptau spre Uniunea Sovietica, aceasta iesind foarte avantajata din acest schimb. In acelasi timp noi importam la pret intreg.

Reparatiile de razboi oficiale se ridicau la suma de de 300 de milioane de dolari, dar sovieticii au reusit sa scoata peste doua miliarde de dolari din participatia lor in sovromuri. Facand o comparatie, produsul intern brut al Romaniei in 1945 era de circa 500 de milioane de dolari.

Odata cu moartea lui Stalin conducerea Partidului Muncitoresc Roman a incercat sa puna capat acestei practici de drenaj a economiei romanesti. Initiativa comunistilor romani a fost aprobata de Hrusciov si in 1954 12 dintre cele mai importante sovromuri au fost preluate de statul roman urmand sa plateasca in schimb suma de noua miliarde de dolari.

Evaluarea romaneasca s-a ridicat doar la trei miliarde a capitalului sovietic investit in aceste societati si dupa discutii diplomatice indelungate suma s-a stabilit undeva la cinci miliarde.

Odata cu desfiintarea ultimului sovrom in 1956 cuplata cu retragerea armatei sovietice de pe teritoriul Romaniei doi ani mai tarziu se marcheaza indepartarea de controlul exercitat de Moscova asupra afacerilor interne ale statului roman si sfarsitul ocupatiei sovietice.

Romania and China – Friends with No Benefits

 

Romania and China – Friends with No Benefits

When it comes to the relations between Romania and China both parties refer to each other as being “old friends”, invoking a “traditional friendship” that ties the two nations separated by more than 8,000 km. Although Romania was one of the earliest countries to recognize the People’s Republic of China and the relations were close during the 1970s and the 1980s, with China being one of Romania’s strategic trading partners, the 1990s have been a period of mutual disengagement not only concerning Romania, but all the Central and Eastern European countries (hereafter referred as CEEC). Closer ties were reestablished starting with 1998 as China consolidated its position as an important player in the global economy, marking its new phase of development by entering the World Trade Organization in 2001, The CEEC were also in a process of reorientation, gaining security guarantees and new economic perspectives through their piecemeal European and Trans-Atlantic integration.

In 2012, China created the 16+1 format  that includes 11 EU members and 5 Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Macedonia) the purpose being that of intensifying and enlarging collaborations in areas such as transport, finance, science, education and culture. Potential priority areas for economic cooperation which Chinese representatives touted were infrastructure, advanced technologies and green technologies.

The 16+1 format is an important part of China’s foreign strategy in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative, the Member States being located at the Western end of China’s flagship international project and at the periphery of China’s largest trading partner, the EU. It is no wonder that the region is of interest for China not only for its peaceful and stable markets, but also for the high-skilled relatively cheap labor, open trade and investment environment. Numerous projects are being implemented in the region with funds coming mainly from the Chinese side (at the last 16+1 summit in Riga, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang formally launched a €10 billion investment fund to finance infrastructure and production capacity projects). Despite the fact that the 16 members were asked to contribute voluntarily in order to supplement the funds and are also asked to shoulder the capital contribution to projects like the AIIB in order to participate, the question on everyone’s mind is how they may profit the most from foreign capital and how that capital will be spent with regards to the long-term viability of the projects. 

Kind words 

As for Romania, in November 2013 it was the first country among the CEEC which Li Keqiang visited and the meeting concluded with a Joint Declaration on deepened bilateral cooperation. As stated in the Declaration, the relations between the two countries "are an example of inter-state relations in the current period" and the Chinese Premier reaffirmed in his speech given to the Romanian Parliament: “I believe that China-Romania cooperation may become a banner for China-CEEC cooperation and that China-CEEC cooperation will surely add new impetus to China-Europe relations”. The “may become” from the above phrase has proven so far to be not just justified cautiousness, but also unfulfilled expectations, as the Romanian authorities have proven to be inconsistent regarding their relations with China. The rhetoric behind the official visits portray a certain attachment of the Socialist-Democrats (the party forming the current majority in Parliament and which is a main source for the current Government) towards China and a more cautious approach from the Romanian President, whose background is liberal and explicitly Western European oriented. These types of asynchronies and asymmetries impede a proper development of the bilateral relations.

Despite the seemingly ideal momentum in the 2012-2015 period, none of the projects that were supposed to form the second wave of Chinese investments came to fruition. The “first wave” until 2010 consisted of small private investors laying the groundwork and probing the local potential, including for business friendliness, while the “second wave” is expected to be represented by significant investments from the large Chinese companies, mainly state owned, in infrastructure and energy. 

Talking money 

Currently, China is the 19^th largest investor in Romania with the total investments amounting to USD 440 million in 2016. According to an ECFR report quoting Chinese researchers and data from the National Statistics Bureau of China, the investment of China in the region grew from USD 400 million in 2009 to 1.7 billion in 2014. 95% of this investment is focused on just 6 countries of the 16 – Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia and Poland. Just five countries out of the 16 (the previous ones minus Bulgaria) account for 80% of China-CEEC trade (whose increasing trade deficit, of 34% is noteworthy in its own right). However, if we look at the investment data in the table below, we can see that Romania’s position is not commensurate with its size and the relative importance we ascribe to it in official communications.

From the table, we see that Romania received just over 11% of total Chinese investment in the CEE region, similar to Bulgaria, but 30% lower than the figure for the Czech Republic, almost half that of Poland and three times less than Hungary, despite the size disparity. While it is normal for countries starting from smaller bases to register high rates of growth in percentages, the rate of growth for Romania’s share of Chinese investment is actually much lower than its three main competitors, Poland and Hungary registering almost a quadrupling and a quintupling, respectively, of Chinese investment in the 2009-2014 period, as opposed to Romania’s doubling. What we may gather from these figures is that Romania has been less competitive than many of its regional peers with regards to attracting Chinese investment and some of it can be laid at the feet of the government itself.

The main Chinese investors in Romania in the last years are: Huawei, China Tobacco International Europe Company, Yuncheng Plate Making, Eurosport DHS and ZTE Romania. As of this year important investments are expected – Ningbo HuaXiang Electronic Co. Ltd. has announced an investment of USD 30 million in a factory that will produce automotive parts for Mercedes, and will begin operations by 2019. Another investment was made public and it targets the building of a luxury center in Băile Govara that will be built by Zhong Hua CTM Holding.

This year, China Energy Company Limited (CEFC) finished the discussions with the KMG International group (former Rompetrol Group) to take over the Petromidia refinery and 500 fuel stations from the Kazakh state company KazMunayGas. As of 2017, the Chinese company will pay USD 680 million and will invest at least USD 3 billion during the next five years, becoming the second largest player in the Romanian fuel market, after Petrom.

Finally, some of the longer-term projects touted by both countries regarding Chinese investment in Romania have yet to come to fruition: the memorandum of cooperation for the Cernavodă Nuclear Power Plant, the joint venture for the Rovinari Coal-Fired Power plant, as well as other projects including the Tarnița Hydropower Plant.

According to the Chinese Ambassador in Romania:

“China-Romania cooperation potential is far beyond the above-mentioned results. Bilateral trade volume has not reached the level of our aspiration and enthusiasm. No China-Romania key economic project has started its construction. No Chinese company has yet won tenders for Romanian infrastructure projects such as motorways and railways. Next step, both sides need to show more confidence, to tap the potential and seek appropriate methods, in order to push forward the mutual beneficial cooperation between China and Romania”. 

Dire conclusions 

As the rest of the CEEC develop extensive infrastructure projects with Chinese partners, Romania has yet to realize the potential of a partnership that can be translated from the rhetoric of official visits to real highways, railways and ports. The cautiousness of the Romanian officials, the ever-changing legislation, the excessive bureaucracy, the legislative instability including yearly changes fiscal policies that are not “foreign investor-friendly”, and above all the arguable lack of drive to make the projects become reality - these are all reasons which may induce China to shift its interest towards more “action oriented” countries.

Maybe it is time to look into our neighbor’s yard not just to see that the grass is greener, but to see how we can make ours the same or even better, and doing this with the help of an old friend is bound to make the process easier.

https://www.themarketforideas.com/romania-and-china-friends-with-no-benefits-a250/

Sino-Romanian Trade Charts

 This chart compares trade between China and Romania by product, considering products traded by both, China and Romania.

https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/rou

Bucharest’s Road to Beijing Goes through Washington

 Bucharest’s Road to Beijing Goes through Washington

As with many other Eastern and Central European nations, Romania has consistently considered its relationship with the United States to be a privileged one: a strategic partnership meant to mitigate the risks of a neighboring assertive Russia. Nonetheless, while some countries from this region have also hedged their bets by taking a welcoming position towards China (Eurasia Daily Monitor, April 30; Eurasia Daily Monitor, June 10), Romania has maintained a very cautious—and reluctant—position in dealing with Beijing, even before China’s recent heightened tensions with the United States rose to prominence on the global scene.

Of course, Romania has cultivated polite and formally cordial relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—both at a bilateral level, and within multilateral formats such as the “16+1” framework (China Brief, February 15; China Brief, May 29). However, trade and investment links have been maintained at only a limited level, compounded by a reticence to develop a politically relevant partnership. In this sense, Romania did not really align itself with a broader Central European trend of warming up towards Beijing. Bucharest has not witnessed a significant increase in Chinese economic activity (either in terms of investment or corporate takeover), as has been seen in Hungary, the Czech Republic, or Slovakia (CHOICE, August 22). Chinese investors have generally kept a low profile in Romania, and even the few joint projects that have been the subject of discussions have failed to materialize.

In addition, since the advent of the trade conflict between China and the United States, Romania has taken an even more cautious stance towards Beijing—prioritizing instead its relationship with Washington, and showing little desire to cause any frictions with its North American ally. This has especially been the case since Vice President Pompeo’s quite explicit hints in his February 2019 Central European tour—during which Pompeo spoke to the need to choose one’s political (and economic) friends very carefully (Radio Free Europe, February 11; U.S. Department of State, February 10).

The latest meeting between the Romanian and American presidents at the White House in August bears witness to these policy orientations (Radio Free Europe, August 21). Although the encounter largely went unnoticed in the circles of China observers, it is nonetheless very relevant for predicting a pattern that is gradually emerging in this region: bringing forth the necessity for Central and Eastern European countries to take an open stand by those that they consider allies.

The Writing is on the Wall: The Perils of (Chinese) 5G

While the timing of the August meeting might have touched upon pre-election domestic campaigning—Mr. Iohannis is facing new presidential elections this year in Romania—it also dealt with fundamental issues in Romania’s security architecture and the consolidation of its strategic partnership with the United States. As always, there were many points on the agenda: NATO, the implicit Russian threat, energy, anti-corruption efforts, and economic relations. Without spending too much time on the bilateral trade balance—negative and on the rise, but still negligible in overall value (Business Review, November 21, 2018)—the two presidents managed to discuss a range of important security issues.

Unsurprisingly, the most salient topic was NATO’s Eastern Flank and its consolidation in the context of the Black Sea’s intensive remilitarization (implicitly connected to concerns over Crimean annexation and its transformation into a full-fledged Russian base of operations). However, after this expected main point, the joint statement emerging from the meeting particularly mentioned that the two countries “seek to avoid the security risks that accompany Chinese investment in 5G telecommunications networks” (Joint Statement, August 20) (hereafter “Joint Statement”). This statement offered no mere hints or euphemistic reading-between-the-lines; it was instead a direct reference to Chinese companies that operate in the international telecommunications market. Furthermore, the point was listed as a security challenge at the top of the list concerning key bilateral issues.

It was later reported by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that an additional memorandum concerning 5G technology was also signed, intended to allow “a rigorous evaluation of suppliers for fully ensuring the security in the implementation of 5G technology” (Calea Europeana, August 22). While no particular company was mentioned, concerns were mentioned regarding transparency, security, and the rule of law, referencing the so-called Prague Proposals (Prague Proposals, May 3). Interpreting the content of this memorandum, the head of the national telecom authority in Romania (ANCOM) argued that review of 5G issues would clearly involve a more proactive role for the Supreme Council of National Defense, a body chaired by the President (RFI Romania, August 21).  Reading between the lines, as Huawei was supposed to be an important equipment supplier for many telecom operators, its case would need careful consideration—and the Chinese telecom giant’s prospects in Romania look rather bleak in the near future.

Energy as National Security: It’s Not Only About Russia

The Joint Statement also made the clear assertion that “[t]he United States and Romania recognize that energy security is national security.” This led to an explicit criticism of the Nord Stream 2 project for increasing the dependency of regional allies upon Russia’s supply of gas (Joint Statement, August 20; Eurasia Daily Monitor, November 14, 2018). In the case of Romania, such assertions must be analyzed in a larger context—one in which China features as a minor but relevant actor.

In the last decade, Beijing has made some incremental steps in becoming a more active player in the Romanian energy market—be it in the form of traditional exploitation and power generation, or in the alternative (“green”) sector. Beyond photovoltaic parks and plans to refurbish existing power-plants (or even develop new ones), the main discussion has been centered around one very important event: the 2015 decision by state-owned CEFC China Energy (中国华信能源, Zhongguo Huaxin Nengyuan) to acquire a majority shareholding in KazMunayGas International from its Kazakh owners (Rompetrol, April 29, 2016). This acquisition would have allowed CEFC to gain control over Rompetrol (owned by KazMunayGas International), a major oil company in Romania and the owner of the country’s largest refinery (Petromidia).

However, when the entire CEFC story unraveled—and company chairman Ye Jianming (叶简明) virtually disappeared, under investigation in China (China Brief, May 9)—the deal for Rompetrol also failed to materialize (RISAP, August 30, 2018). There was no longer any delicate decision for the Romanian authorities to make. Nonetheless, the PRC interest in taking on a greater role in the region’s energy architecture cannot be presumed to have waned, and that is why the Joint Statement is very relevant in this context. Identifying energy issues as national security challenges presents a much greater role for Romania’s Supreme Council of National Defense in reviewing transactions that involve natural resources. Prospective Chinese investments will likely be placed into an unpredictable limbo in regards to their potential access to one of the most promising energy markets at the edge of the European Union.

The Nuclear Option: On (Responsibly) Choosing One’s Friends

A third issue that has a bearing upon Romania’s economic relations with the PRC pertains to the dilemma of developing new generation capacities in Romania’s aging nuclear plant at Cernavodă, located near the southeast Black Sea coast. While the U.S.-Romanian Joint Statement merely asserted that “[w]e further urge our industries to work closely together to support Romania’s civil nuclear energy goals” (Joint Statement, August 20), this text appeared in the context of a larger discussion within Romania. Romania’s sole nuclear plant in Cernavodă is a project dating back to the final decade of Communist rule; it has two operational units and is reliant upon Canadian technology. In the late 2000s, a quest for building two additional units began, with multiple offers that came to no fruition.

In 2015, a memorandum of understanding was signed for a joint venture (a public-private partnership) with the PRC state-owned enterprise China General Nuclear Power (CGN); the value of said deal was estimated by some to be almost $8 billion (Economica, June 6; World Nuclear News, May 8). In 2019, a preliminary investment agreement was signed in the presence of officials from both countries, prompting the Chinese ambassador to state that “[t]he Chinese government will work together with the Romanian government for the nuclear power project to start as soon as possible, setting a good example for pragmatic cooperation between the two countries” (Xinhua, May 8).

Image: The Cernavodă Nuclear Plant in southeastern Romania, which dates back to a joint Romanian-Canadian project commenced in the 1980s. A memorandum of understanding was signed in 2015 for the PRC state-owned China General Nuclear Power Corporation (CGN) to enter into a joint venture to continue construction on the facility—with a subsequent preliminary agreement signed in May 2019—but work at Cernavodă under these agreements has yet to begin. (Source: CGN)

This deal seemed like a classic Belt and Road offering, but with a strategic twist. Influential voices in Romania—such as former President Traian Băsescu—promptly manifested their dissent against allowing a state-owned Chinese company to gain control over a part of Romania’s energy production capacities, and “becoming dependent on China’s nuclear technology” (Mediafax, May 16). The situation appears to be even more complicated, as CGN has been recently placed on the “entity list” by the U.S. Department of Commerce, effectively barring the company from acquiring products and technologies from American firms on grounds that it had “engaged in or enabled efforts to acquire advanced U.S. nuclear technology and material for diversion to military uses in China” (Department of Commerce, August 14).

Therefore, based upon the contexts of Romania’s continuous emphasis on its strategic partnership with its North American ally and its renewed pledge to closely align on global challenges (including energy matters), it is a safe bet to say that cooperation with Chinese entities that have been ‘blacklisted’ in the United States—such as CGN—shall also be reviewed by Romania in terms of national security, possibly leading to a discontinuation of the Chinese investment project.

Conclusion: Sending a Regional Message to Central and Eastern European States

The August meeting between the U.S. and Romanian presidents needs to be understood in an extended strategic environment, not merely in bilateral terms. Its implications pertain to the larger regional—and global arena, in which Russia and China have been designated as challengers to the established system of international order. Thus, it must be taken into consideration that the Joint Statement reflects much more than a lofty communique uttered in diplomatic parlance, especially in the context of an increasing trade conflict with China.

This document was the first official Romanian declaration that directly referenced and singled out “Chinese investment in 5G” as a potential problem. Furthermore, it was meant to show Romania’s resolution in attaining joint strategic objectives together with the United States. At the same time, given the ambiguous relations that some other American allies in the Central and East European region maintain with China, it sent a clear signal in a diplomatic realm that is sometimes immersed in duplicity. Thus, it was not really a message for Beijing, and not merely another episode in an ever-escalating trade conflict—rather, it was a blueprint for America’s regional allies, and a statement on the necessity to take an unequivocal stance regarding relations with China.

Horia Ciurtin is an Associate Expert at the New Strategy Center (Bucharest, Romania), a Research Fellow for the European Federation for Investment Law and Arbitration (Brussels, Belgium), and ad External PhD Researcher at the Amsterdam Center for International Law (Amsterdam, Netherlands). He also serves as a legal consultant in the field of international investment law throughout the Balkans and CEE. He recently published the study entitled “A New Era in Cross-Strait Relations? A Post-Sovereign Enquiry in Taiwan’s Investment Treaty System”, in Julien Chaisse (ed.), China’s Investment Three-Prong Strategy: The Bilateral, Regional, and Global Tracks, Oxford University Press, 2019. Contact him at h.a.ciurtin@uva.nl.

热水

 首先先强调一下，标题里写的是温水，不是热水。其实一般生活中，“温水”、“热水”、“白开水” 这几个词是可以互换的。毕竟，沸腾fèiténg的热水，你也喝不下去，是吧。 为什么叫白开水呢，开水是热的。水开了就是水煮zhǔ到沸腾点了。白是浪费了的意思，所以白白浪费刚煮开的水，需要重新烧水了，就是晾凉liàng liáng了之后的水。但是不管用哪个词，想表达的意思还是 “沸腾后又降到温热状态的“水。

那为什么中国人偏爱piān’ài温水呢？

其实最开始，我们的先祖是热水，凉水都喝的。公元前250年—150年左右，《孟子》里有这样一句话：“冬日则饮汤，夏日则饮水”，古代的“汤tāng”说的是热水；而“夏日则饮水”中的“水”，就是普通的凉水。这是取于阴和阳的概念，我们在第12期有说过，中国人很注重阴阳平衡，身体健康。

话虽是这么说，但是宋代之前能喝上热水的，基本上都是王公贵族，有钱人。到了宋朝，市场经济高速发展，茶文化开始盛行起来。有钱人虽然喝茶，但也不全是热茶，通常都是早起烧一壶茶，晾在那慢慢喝，有客人登门才特意泡pào热茶以示礼貌。但喝白开水是个别养生专家才做的事，大多数老百姓还是很务实的，喝点凉水就够了。温水是老人、病人、孕妇yùnfù专有的福利。

所以第一种说法就诞生了。中国人喝温水是为了养生。其中也许也会有一点点身家地位的表现吧。

养生当然重要，但是更重要的还是卫生。从古代开始，由于环境污染和管道老化，瘟疫wēnyì、寄生虫和肠胃炎问题还是非常常见的，尤其是农村地区。痢疾lìjí，霍乱huòluàn holeră这类的传染病一旦暴发，便立刻蔓延mànyán a se răspândi全村。

这种情况在英国也出现过。1858年的“Great Stink” 和不断复发的霍乱导致1859年到1865年期间，英国重新建立了污水处理系统，让每家每户可以喝到干净的凉水。但是中国面积那么大，人那么多，短时间内重建污水处理系统是不实际的。那怎么办呢？烧热水呗！

1934年，执政的国民政府，发起了一场声势浩大的“新生活运动”，“水不沸fèi不喝”，正是这场运动的重要内容。在政府的倡导chàngdǎo advocate, propose下，全国许多城市都兴起了一门叫做“熟水店”的生意，为市民提供廉价liánjià ieftin的热水，不少普通市民，享受到了热水的美好。

1949年之后，政府重点增强了“喝热水”，“喝开水”的宣教和执行，多次呼吁“要反复教育群众喝开水和消毒过的水，不喝生水”，这也是解放后我们人口爆发增长的原因之一

“多喝热水”逐渐zhújiàn根植在了无数父母辈的中国人记忆中，代代传承chuánchéng。传着传着，就变成了今天调侃tiáokǎn直男的网络梗。

什么意思呢，就是不管女生有什么问题，有一些男生的答案永远是 “喝点热水就好了”。有一个很搞笑的的meme，我放在网站上，大家可以看一下。链接在下面description box 里。

所以，无论是为了养生还是卫生还是鼓励调侃直男的网络梗，我们中国人喝热水的优良传统维持到了今天。所以，大家别忘了多喝热水哦。 我们下周见。

来事

1. 会来事 have a way with people

2. 这样做不来事 Așa nu va fi bine. (folosit în negații)

3. a provoca necaz 

知来事 a prezice viitorul

喝一点热水吧

 

Chinese proapaganda war

 

China's promotion of Russian disinformation indicates where its loyalties lie

By Simone McCarthy and CNN's Beijing Bureau

Updated 1523 GMT (2323 HKT) March 10, 2022

Beijing (CNN)In public statements and at international summits, Chinese officials have attempted to stake out a seemingly neutral position on the war in Ukraine, neither condemning Russian actions nor ruling out the possibility Beijing could act as a mediator in a push for peace.

But while its international messaging has kept many guessing as to Beijing's true intentions, much of its domestic media coverage of Russia's invasion tells a wholly different story.

There, an alternate reality is playing out for China's 1.4 billion people, one in which the invasion is nothing more than a "special military operation," according to its national broadcaster CCTV; the United States may be funding a biological weapons program in Ukraine, and Russian President Vladimir Putin is a victim standing up for a beleaguered Russia.

To tell that story, major state-run news media outlets -- which dominate China's highly censored media space -- have been largely echoing Russian state media stories or information from Russian officials.

A CNN analysis reviewed nearly 5,000 social media posts from 14 Chinese state media outlets during the first eight days of Russia's invasion posted onto China's Twitter-like platform, Weibo. The analysis found that of the more than 300 most-shared posts about the events in Ukraine -- which were each shared more than 1,000 times -- almost half, about 140, were what CNN classified as distinctly pro-Russian, often containing information attributed to a Russian official or picked up directly from Russia's state media.

The analysis, which focused on stories that got the most play on social media, may not be representative of all posts shared by state media outlets on Weibo. But it provides a snapshot of the state media-produced information that is most visible to the more than half a billion monthly users on the popular platform.

It's not clear the extent to which these posts may be explicitly the result of a coordinated propaganda campaign between the two countries, but it is consistent with an ongoing pattern in which Russian and Chinese media have amplified and reinforced their often-interchangeable talking points on issues such as the treatment of Russian dissidents, Hong Kong pro-democracy protests, the origins of the Covid-19 pandemic, or the supposed American role in fomenting "color revolutions" against authoritarian regimes.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping walk down the stairs as they arrive for a BRICS summit in Brasilia, Brazil in 2019.

Such mutual reinforcement has also spilled over into the extensive overseas and English-language propaganda operations that both countries have built to promote their views globally -- a route made more important with Russia's state media outlets being banned on air and online in parts of the West.

In China's top-down government-controlled media environment, all state-affiliated content is vetted and issued in accordance with government directives. That China has chosen to follow Russia's lead in deliberately mischaracterizing the war only serves to underline Beijing's closeness to Moscow -- and almost makes a mockery of China's self-proclaimed impartiality in helping to engage with Russia and bring an end to the violence.

The playbook

Russian assurances that civilian sites will not be targeted -- despite extensive evidence to the contrary, descriptions of Ukrainian soldiers using "Nazi" tactics, and misinformation regarding the whereabouts of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky are all stories that have been funneled from Russian sources into China's enclosed social media ecosystem -- where many Western news outlets are blocked -- by its state media outlets in recent days.

That dynamic was at play on Monday morning, when China's state broadcaster CCTV released a package in its morning newscast highlighting Moscow's erroneous claim that Washington had funded the development of biological weapons in Ukrainian labs. That insinuation is used to support the narrative that Ukraine -- characterized by Moscow as an American puppet state -- threatens Russia, and not the other way around.

The source? Russian Defense Ministry Spokesman Igor Konashenkov, who on Sunday said Russian forces uncovered "evidence" of the "hasty measures to conceal any traces of the military biological program finance(d) by the US Department of Defense," and referenced documents he said detailed the destruction of hazardous pathogens at these facilities on the order of the Ukrainian Health Ministry.

In a statement on Twitter Wednesday, White House press secretary Jen Psaki pushed back on "Russia's false claims about alleged US biological weapons labs and chemical weapons development in Ukraine" and noted the "echoing" of those "conspiracy theories" by Chinese officials.

"This is preposterous. It's the kind of disinformation operation we've seen repeatedly from the Russians over the years in Ukraine and in other countries, which have been debunked, and an example of the types of false pretexts we have been warning the Russians would invent," Psaki said, adding that the US was "in full compliance" with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention and "does not develop or possess such weapons anywhere."

"Now that Russia has made these false claims, and China has seemingly endorsed this propaganda, we should all be on the lookout for Russia to possibly use chemical or biological weapons in Ukraine, or to create a false flag operation using them. It's a clear pattern," Psaki said.

The subject was also raised in a Senate hearing on Tuesday, when Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland, asked if Ukraine had biological weapons, said it has biological research facilities, which the US was concerned Russian forces may be seeking to control.

"We are working with the Ukrainians on how they can prevent any of those research materials from falling into the hands of Russian forces, should they approach," Nuland said.

Minutes after the CCTV report aired, an affiliated news outlet released an online post repeating the claims from Russia's Defense Ministry and started a related hashtag on Weibo, which began trending. The hashtag was viewed more than 45 million times over a period of hours that day.

The next day, after Russia doubled down on the biological weapons claims with further statements, without evidence, CCTV released a new television segment, which was again shared by prominent state media outlets on Weibo, gaining further traction.

The story then moved into the narrative of China's officials when a state media reporter at a regular Foreign Ministry press briefing asked a question about the laboratories, prompting the spokesperson to read a lengthy prepared response that repeated Russian disinformation.

"We once again urge the US to fully clarify its biological militarization activities both inside and outside its borders and accept multilateral verification," spokesperson Zhao Lijian said.

Within hours, at least 17 state media outlets, including CCTV, Xinhua, and the People's Daily, posted Zhao's response on Weibo, where the topic racked up more than 210 million views. A related hashtag rose to be the top trending topic on Weibo by the following afternoon.

The pattern is just one example of a playbook that enables China to cover the war through the lens of Russian rhetoric and disinformation. Other examples include stories, such as repeated false claims that Zelensky fled the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv -- sourced to a single Russian lawmaker, which were picked up and amplified by both Chinese and Russian state media outlets on their domestic and international platforms.

A CNN analysis sought to understand how large a role such stories play in China's tightly controlled media ecosystem, first by combing through nearly 5,000 social media posts from the Weibo accounts of 14 of China's most influential state media outlets, focusing on the first eight days of the invasion and news about the events in Ukraine.

Next, CNN analyzed which of those posts were the most highly engaged with, identifying more than 300 posts shared on Weibo more than 1,000 times. Of those more than 300 posts, an analysis found that nearly half showed Russia in a positive light -- a category CNN defined as news sourced solely from Russian officials or Russian media, content that describes Ukraine negatively, misinformation about Zelensky, or pro-Putin coverage.

While about 140 posts showed Russia in a positive light, the analysis identified fewer than 15 posts that portrayed Ukraine positively.

A look at other characterizations showed only around 90 of these posts were neutral -- for example, purely factual reports from reliable sources, news about humanitarian aid or updates on the evacuation of Chinese citizens from Ukraine.

Just over a third were what CNN classified as anti-West or anti-US, for example: stories airing views that Russia was pushed to action in Ukraine by the expansion of NATO, or criticizing Western media coverage of the crisis.

CNN reporters classified some posts into more than one category. A look at the distribution shows posts that depicted Russia in a positive light were more frequent than any other category.

Because CNN only studied posts with high engagement, the findings may not be representative of all posts produced by state media.

In response to CNN's request for comment, the Chinese Foreign Ministry said Thursday the country is a victim of disinformation.

"Some anti-China forces and media have fabricated too many lies, rumors and disinformation about China on issues that include the situation in Ukraine," it said in a statement. "They have smeared the image of China, poisoned the media environment and misled public worldwide. Such actions are hypocritical and despicable."

The backdrop

The findings contrast the apparent middle line that China has tried to walk in its international diplomacy.

Though Beijing has stood apart from the Western response to Russia's invasion, with its diplomats refusing to condemn the invasion, or even call it such, and decrying Western sanctions, it has also frequently repeated that "all countries' legitimate security concerns" should be addressed.

In a virtual summit with French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz on Tuesday, Chinese leader Xi Jinping called for negotiations to bring about "peaceful outcomes" and stressed China's promises to contribute humanitarian aid to Ukraine.

"There is a difference between the way China talks to the international audience and the way it talks to the domestic audience ... for the domestic audience, it's important to preserve this partnership with Russia, because that's a political priority for Xi," said Alexander Gabuev, a senior fellow and the chair of the Russia in the Asia-Pacific Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center.

He points to the increasingly close relationship between China and Russia in recent years, a strategic partnership strengthened, in part, by shared friction with the West.

"So (China's leaders) need to shape public perceptions about this, and explain why dealing with Russia is morally justified or is the right thing to do -- and (China's media coverage) serves this purpose," he said.

A glimpse into how China may seek to control its coverage was given in the days prior to the invasion, when an internal directive that was apparently accidentally shared on social media showed Chinese state media outlet Beijing News ordered its employees not to publish news reports that were "negative about Russia or pro-West." Beijing News did not respond to requests for comment.

Maria Repnikova, director of the Center for Global Information Studies at Georgia State University, said Russia-leaning coverage was in line with historical precedent: "Stories that are critical of Russia or are portraying Russia in an unfavorable manner are generally censored," she said.

"As a result of that, it is expedient to use Russian state media sources because they're the ones portraying the (Ukraine) conflict with a more favorable eye or view from the Russian perspective," she said.

Another sign of this has been which voices have been allowed to thrive on China's heavily censored social media platforms in the wake of the invasion. There, pro-Russia and anti-Western, nationalistic voices have also dominated, while there has been a suppression of pro-Ukrainian or anti-war messages on platforms and across the media landscape.

One glaring example came Friday, when CCTV broadcast a speech from International Paralympic Committee President Andrew Parsons, at the opening ceremony of the Beijing Paralympic Games, in which many parts of the speech were muffled and were not translated.

The offending context? Parsons' "message of peace," in which he did not name Russia or Ukraine but said he was "horrified at what is taking place in the world."

Those voices from within China who have tried to speak up -- including five history professors who penned an open letter voicing their strong opposition to "Russia's war against Ukraine" -- have seen their posts swiftly deleted or social accounts suspended.

"We have seen alternative, critical voices -- some subtle critique or attempts to present scenes from the war zone and talk about humanity and empathy toward Ukraine -- (but) a lot of these messages have been censored," said Repnikova.

Social media platforms in China have taken action against extremist nationalist voices in recent weeks, with Sina Weibo "punishing" around 75 accounts and screening out more than 1,500 posts and video-streaming platform Douyin removing over 6,000 illegal videos, according to the state-owned Global Times. But the nationalistic voices that have dominated social media platforms fall in line with what Repnikova describes as "a significant spike in digital nationalism, (with) the US and the West (as) the key target of this nationalistic sentiment."

Break the monopoly

That nationalist sentiment -- fueled by a deep distrust of the US and concern about its role as the leading global power -- are a critical part of the glue that has firmed up the Russian and Chinese relationship in recent years.

It's also filtered in the kinds of media coverage that each have shared overseas, as both Russia and China have sought to deepen their propaganda efforts, launching social media-friendly news brands in English and other languages, like China's CGTN and RT (formerly Russia Today).

While experts say it's unclear if top media officials from the two countries are discussing news coverage at an operational level and some official coordination is more symbolic in nature, there is a growing push in recent years for alignment and content-sharing.

A number of content-sharing arrangements exist between Chinese and Russian media outlets, and the shared vision is clear: these outlets together can "break the monopoly of Western media," as a Global Times report on a China-Russia media forum in 2015 put it.

Fast-forward to the crisis in Ukraine and the upside of that collaboration, for one partner anyway, is clear.

In the European Union, Kremlin-backed media outlets RT and Sputnik were officially banned as of last Wednesday, with companies like Meta, parent of Facebook and Instagram, and Google's YouTube stepping in to block their content.

But, on China's channels like CGTN and Global Times, which continue to operate, those Russian talking points are still getting through.

Already this week, posts from those accounts have suggested Ukraine and the US have pro-Nazi leanings, repeated Russian misinformation on the laboratories, and cited Russia denying that it plans to overthrow the existing government in its "special military operation" in Ukraine.

https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/10/china/china-russia-disinformation-campaign-ukraine-intl-dst-hnk/index.html